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THE FUTURE OF UK-IRISH RELATIONS 
Etain Tannam*
This article examines the impact of Brexit on the British-Irish intergovernmental 
relationship and places the assessment in the context of the contemporary history of the 
relationship. In particular it highlights the importance of the intergovernmental 
relationship since 1985 and its role in the peace process and the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement. First, the importance of the British-Irish relationship and the EU in 
achieving a peace process in Northern Ireland is examined and the implications of 
Brexit are assessed. The challenges of Brexit are then outlined, before Brexit's impact 
to date is evaluated. Finally, in conclusion, potential methods of managing the 
relationship between the UK and Ireland after Brexit are outlined and it is argued 
that stronger use of the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference is necessary to 
ensure future cooperation, as well as developing stronger institutional links across a 
range of policy areas.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The outcome of Brexit was always going to be a challenge to British-Irish 
relations, but few would have expected the perfect storm of events that 
ensued: a weak UK government, a confidence-and-supply arrangement 
between the British Conservative Party and the Northern Ireland 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the death of Martin McGuinness, one of 
the original signatories and negotiators of the Good Friday Agreement, and 
a collapsed Northern Ireland Executive. The period from June 2016 to March 
2019 created great stress in the British-Irish relationship. In this article the 
importance of the British-Irish relationship and the EU in achieving the 
peace process in Northern Ireland from 1990 to 1998 is examined and the 
implications of Brexit are assessed. In Section III, the challenges of Brexit 
are analysed and, in Section IV, Brexit's impact from June 2016 to March 
2019 is evaluated. Finally, in conclusion, potential methods of managing the 
relationship after Brexit are outlined. In assessing levels of cooperation, the 
focus is on the rhetoric from both governments. 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BRITISH-IRISH RELATIONSHIP AND THE 
EU IN THE IRISH PEACE PROCESS 
British-Irish cooperation was central to the success of the peace process in 
Northern Ireland and the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement on 
10 April 1998.1 The two parties had many conflicts of interest about the best 
means of achieving peace from the 1960s to the 1980s, but from the mid-
1980s a process of cooperation developed.2 The '3 strands approach' to 
 
1 David Mitchell, Etain Tannam and Sarah Wallace, '20 Years of the Good Friday 
Agreement: Political Dimensions' (2008) Irish Political Studies 283 – 310. 
2 Etain Tannam, Cross-Border Cooperation in Ireland and Northern Ireland (Basingstoke 
Palgrave 1999). 
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conflict resolution became central to the peace process, in the context also 
of EU membership. UK and Irish membership of the EU from 1973 was 
regarded by many observers as a factor in increasing British-Irish 
cooperation; as O'Brennan notes, before 1973, no British Prime Minister had 
visited Ireland since 1921.3  
1. John Hume and the '3 Strands Approach' 
Cooperation did not evolve spontaneously, but reflected the strategy of John 
Hume, former leader of the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), and his 
influence on Irish policy-making. Hume's '3 strands approach'4 was based on 
the argument that the conflict in Northern Ireland was an identity conflict 
between nationalists, on the one hand, whose democratic rights were not 
protected in a unionist regime, and unionists, on the other, who feared that 
they were under threat from irredentist Irish governments and nationalists. 
The '3 strands approach' was based on the argument that the key to resolving 
the conflict was to reassure both communities that their rights were 
protected and the key to achieving such reassurance was through ensuring 
that three sets of relations – or strands – were cooperative: 1) relations 
between communities in Northern Ireland; 2) cross-border relations on the 
island of Ireland; and 3) relations between British and Irish governments.  
Strand 1 aimed to create democratic, legitimate institutions in Northern 
Ireland that represented both nationalists and unionists and would respect 
their rights. Strand 2 would develop institutions to encourage cross-border 
economic cooperation to maximise economic potential, but also bring about 
greater social communication and cooperation. Strand 3 was important 
because the UK and Ireland were kinship states. In other words nationalists 
looked to the Irish government for protection, but that protection had not 
been forthcoming up until the outbreak of the conflict. The unionists thus 
looked to the UK government for protection. By ensuring both communities 
 
3 John O'Brennan, 'Requiem for a Shared Independent Past: Brexit and the 
deterioration of in UK-Irish Relations' (2019) 5 Capital and Class 1-15. 
4 'Hume says new structures are needed and endorses three-strand approach', Irish 
Times (August 18 1997) <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/hume-says-new-
structures-are-needed-and-endorses-three-strand-approach-1> accessed 1 
October 2019. 
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felt protected their  members would  be less likely to resort to violence. These 
strands became integral to the Good Friday Agreement.  
In short, conflict resolution in Northern Ireland rested on the totality of the 
relationship between Ireland, Northern Ireland and Britain. Hume's 
emphasis on two identities co-existing and on the ability to aspire to be a 
united Ireland, yet also accept the legitimacy of being in the UK state, was 
based on his appreciation of the EU as a successful experiment of post-war 
cooperation. Repeatedly he cited the example of the Franco-German 
reconciliation, stating that if France and Germany could cooperate after 
World War II and centuries of hostility, then so too could nationalists and 
unionists in Northern Ireland. The EU framework of cooperation was vital 
to identify common economic interests and build trust on that basis within 
that institutional framework.  
In 1984, despite the UK government's misgivings, the European Parliament 
issued a report, known as the Haagerup Report, that defined the conflict in 
Northern Ireland as an 'identity conflict', thus echoing the Irish government 
and John Hume's approach.5 It was an historic event in that it was the first 
time the EU became involved in the Northern Ireland conflict. Although it 
is difficult to provide evidence of the EU's causal role in British-Irish 
cooperation, or in the peace process itself,6 the former's involvement and 
approach legitimised the Irish government and Hume's idea, making it more 
difficult for opponents to undermine it.  
The identity approach, combined with the conception of Northern Ireland 
as an example of a failure of majoritarian democracy, contributed to an 
emphasis on institutionalising the Irish dimension and on British-Irish 
cooperation as a way to resolve the conflict. By enshrining institutionally an 
Irish role in policy towards Northern Ireland, nationalists would feel 
protected; and by ensuring any Irish role was in conjunction with the UK's 
role, unionists would feel protected. Cross-border cooperation would also 
reassure both communities about the merits of economic cooperation and 
increase networking, so that trust increased between nationalists and 
 
5 Katy Hayward, 'Reiterating National Identities: The European Union Conception 
of Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland' (2006) 41(3) Cooperation and Conflict 
261-284. 
6 Tannam (n 2). 
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unionists. Internally, developing democratic power-sharing institutions in 
Northern Ireland that represented both communities was central. Strand 3 - 
the British-Irish relationship – was the necessary condition to achieving 
cooperation in Strands 1 and 2. Without it, the other levels of cooperation 
would not develop.  
The failure of the Sunningdale Agreement in 19737 in the face of unionist 
opposition created an awareness that unless both British and Irish 
government  stood firm in a joint approach to Northern Ireland, any efforts 
to create peace would be thwarted by either Sinn Fein, or the DUP.8 Thus, in 
1980 Charles Haughey, then Irish Prime Minister, met with his UK 
counterpart, Margaret Thatcher, to begin a new era of cooperation. 
2. The Anglo-Irish Agreement 
Under the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Anglo-Irish Conference was 
established. It was the first time in Northern Irish history that a UK 
government did not yield to unionist pressure not to engage with the Irish 
government and that both governments supported each other in following 
through with the agreement.9 Thousands of unionists marched against the 
1985 Agreement, in protest at the Irish role in the Anglo-Irish Conference. 
However, the Conservative party, led by Margaret Thatcher, refused to yield 
to the pressure, with both governments stating that the Agreement, unlike 
the Sunnnigdale Agreement, had been ratified as an international treaty in 
the UN and could not be revoked except by mutual consent of both 
governments. As such, the Agreement remained intact.10  
 
7 The Sunningdale Agreement created a power-sharing executive in Northern 
Ireland and a Council of Ireland representing the Irish government and Northern 
Irish devolved government. The Council of Ireland was to have executive powers 
over key policy areas including policing. Many unionists strongly opposed the 
Agreement for that reason and the agreement was brought down following a strike 
by Ulster Workers Council., It was never ratified at the UN, so did not have the 
status of international treaty.  
8 Brendan O'Leary, 'The Limits to Coercive Consociationalism in Northern Ireland' 
(1989) 4 Political Studies xxxvii 455-65. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry, 'The Politics of Antagonism' (Athlone Press 
1996). 
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The 1985 Agreement comprised seven articles, all of which laid out the role 
and operation of the Conference, giving the Irish government a consultative 
role in matters of concern to nationalists. Its areas were listed as political 
matters, security and related matters, and legal matters, including the 
administration of justice and the promotion of cross-border cooperation.11 
Under article 3, it was stated that:  
The Conference shall meet at Ministerial or official level as required. The 
business of the Conference will thus receive attention at the highest level. 
Regular and frequent Ministerial meetings will be held and in particular 
special meetings shall be convened at the request of either side.12 
The Anglo-Irish Agreement laid the groundwork for the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement, not just in its broad principle of enshrining an Irish role in policy 
of Northern Ireland, but also in its negotiation process, whereby a joint 
British-Irish strategy emerged.13  Anglo-Irish relations emerged as a central 
part of that cooperation.  
From 1985 onwards senior British and Irish civil servants continued to meet 
regularly and developed an exceptional working and, in some instances, 
personal relationship.14 Many civil servants observed how, over time, 
problem-solving became a joint exercise.15 Both the conceptualisation of a 
problem and its solutions emerged organically from both governments and 
adversarial policy making declined. It was this approach that typified the 
negotiations that preceded the Good Friday Agreement.  
The strategy that emerged from the British-Irish policy process was one 
coined 'coercive consocationalism'.16 The aim was to achieve a consociational 
settlement in Northern Ireland, implying a power-sharing devolved 
government that protected the nationalist minority by giving all parties a 
 
11 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) 
<https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/northerni
reland/Anglo-Irish-Agreement-1985.pdf> accessed 1 October 2019, Art 2. 
12 Ibid Art 3.  
13 O'Leary and McGarry (n 10) 238. 
14 Etain Tannam, 'Explaining the Good Friday Agreement: a learning process' (2001) 
36(4) Government and Opposition 493-518.  
15 Ibid 500. 
16 O'Leary (n 8). 
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veto over any policy that undermined a vital interest of its community. The 
coercive aspect referred to the carrot-and-stick strategy of enticing Sinn 
Fein, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), and the DUP to cooperate so as to 
have democratic power, but threatening to exclude them from negotiations 
if they did not cooperate. Overall from the mid-1980s the British-Irish 
relationship was characterised by a joint policy making approach and an 
emphasis on both governments as honest brokers.17 Eventually, this made 
them co-guarantors of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. 
3. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 
The Good Friday Agreement was signed on April 10 1998. It was not simply 
consociational, but a bespoke version, 'consociation plus',18 encompassing 
Hume's '3 strands approach'. Strand 2 of the Agreement provided for the 
cross-border North-South Ministerial Council representing Irish and 
Northern Irish ministers and their civil servants  to decide policy in six areas 
of cooperation. Strand 3 resurrected and modified the old Anglo-Irish 
Conference, but re-named it the British-Irish Intergovernmental 
Conference. It also provided for a new British-Irish Council to represent 
Northern Ireland, Ireland, Britain, Scotland, Wales and the Crown 
Dependencies.  
The British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, 'dealing with the totality 
of the relationships',19 was to meet frequently, like the Anglo-Irish 
Conference. Unlike the Anglo-Irish Conference, however, the Belfast/Good 
Friday Agreement stipulated that the British-Irish Intergovernmental 
Conference was to meet at summit level (that is with both Prime Ministers 
 
17 Etain Tannam, 'Cracks Beginning to Show in British-Irish Relationship' (LSC 
Blogs, 26 July 2017) <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/07/26/cracks-are-
beginning-to-appear-in-british-irish-relations/> accessed 14 September 2019. 
18 Brendan O'Leary 'The Twilight of the United Kingdom and Tiocfaidh ar Lá: 
Twenty Years after the Good Friday Agreement', in Tannam (ed) Beyond the Good 
Friday Agreement in the midst of Brexit (London Routledge 2018) 2. 
19 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (1998) available at <https://www.britishirish 
council.org/agreement-reached-multi-party-negotiations/strand-3-british-irish-
council-and-intergovernmental> Strand 3, para 1.  
 
282 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
 
 
in attendance) 'as requireed',20 but otherwise at ministerial level as 
appropriate. The Council enshrined the Irish government's role:  
In recognition of the Irish Government's special interest in Northern 
Ireland and of the extent to which issues of mutual concern arise in relation 
to Northern Ireland, there will be regular and frequent meetings of the 
Conference concerned with non-devolved Northern Ireland matters, on 
which the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals. These 
meetings, to be co-chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, would also deal with all-island and 
cross-border co-operation on non-devolved issues.  
Co-operation within the framework of the Conference will include 
facilitation of co-operation in security matters. The Conference also will 
address, in particular, the areas of rights, justice, prisons and policing in 
Northern Ireland (unless and until responsibility is devolved to a Northern 
Ireland administration) and will intensify co-operation between the two 
Governments on the all-island or cross-border aspects of these matters.21  
Strand 3 also provided for the British-Irish Council, a consultative body to 
discuss sectoral policy issues, and comprising ministers from Ireland, 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and the Crown Dependencies as well as the Irish 
and UK Prime Ministers or their delegates. Its function was to 'promote the 
harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of 
relationships among the peoples of these islands.'22 Furthermore, it was to 
meet 'at summit level, twice per year; in specific sectoral formats on a regular 
basis, with each side represented by the appropriate Minister; in an 
appropriate format to consider cross-sectoral matters.'23  
The EU was also mentioned explicitly in the Agreement under Strand 2.24  A 
specific cross-border body, the Special EU Programmes Body, was created to 
administer EU funding. However, the EU's implicit relevance was far greater 
than the explicit relevance. The multi-level non-territorial conception of 
identity and the functional logic of cooperation were regarded as important 
contextual factors in the Agreement not simply for Northern Ireland, but for 
 
20 Ibid Strand 3, para 3. 
21 Ibid Strand 3. 
22 Ibid Strand 3, para 1. 
23 Ibid Strand 3, para 3. 
24 Ibid Strand 2. 
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the British-Irish relationship. Afterall, the Agreement was negotiated and 
ratified in the context of the recently created Single European Market 
(SEM), removing non-tariff obstacles to freedom of movement of goods, 
services, capitals and people.25 
EU membership affected the British-Irish relationship in three ways. To 
begin with, it paradoxically advanced Irish national sovereignty vis-a-vis the 
UK, where it was once perceived to be  an 'un-equal sovereign.'26 The EU 
created a more symmetrical relationship, highlighting that Ireland was a state 
with its own government and policies. In addition, as new EU policies 
emerged, Ireland and the UK often had common interests and were allies in 
the EU, for example in taxation and social welfare policies. Finally, the EU 
created a neutral framework where British and Irish diplomats and 
politicians met regularly, both formally and informally. One former Irish 
ambassador to the UK commented that there were on average 25 meetings a 
day in Brussels where Irish and UK representatives met.27  
Clearly British-Irish intergovernmental cooperation was central to stability 
in Northern Ireland and the EU's role was also significant, both normatively 
and practically. As Jennifer Todd perceptively observed in 2014:  
The settlement in Northern Ireland was achieved and later stabilised only in 
the context of a strong British-Irish relationship […] This was a conjunctural 
achievement of the 1990s and early 2000s. There was no reason to expect it 
to be permanent.28 
Indeed, Todd predicted that 'as attention slips from senior officials and 
politicians, so the prospects of slippage in the stability of the Northern 
Ireland settlement increases'.29 Although it was not known to Todd and 
 
25 O'Brennan (n 3). 
26 Patrick Keatinge, 'Un-Equal Sovereigns: the diplomatic dimension of Anglo-Irish 
Relations' in PJ Drudy (ed) Ireland and Britain Since 1922 (Cambridge University 
Press 1984) 139-161.  
27 Ambassador Daniel Mulhall, evidence to House of Lords European Union 
Committee, Brexit: UK-Irish relations, 6th Report of Session 2016-17, 42, para 171.  
28 Jennifer Todd, 'The vulnerability of a (quasi-)constitutional settlement: Northern 
Ireland after 1998 and the British-Irish relationship' (2014) Working Paper 112,  
Institute for British-Irish Studies, University College Dublin, 20. 
29 Todd (n 28) 20. 
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others at the time, an event a few years later would indeed have the potential 
to  remove attention away from Northern Ireland and the peace process. In 
the next section, the challenges of this event – Brexit – to intergovernmental 
cooperation are summarised and an analysis of Brexit's impact to date is 
provided.  
III. BREXIT'S CHALLENGES TO THE BRITISH-IRISH RELATIONSHIP 
Brexit posed various challenges to the British-Irish relationship: first, a 
potential resurgence of the Irish unification issue; second, potential damage 
to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement; third, the creation of conflicts of 
interest; and fourth, the removal of the EU framework for cooperation.  
1. Irish Unification 
As noted by Connelly and Doyle in this special issue,30 the Belfast/Good 
Friday Agreement sought to detoxify the issue of unification by providing a 
settlement that attempted to reflect both unionist and nationalist voices and 
had no pre-determined outcome. Opinion surveys repeatedly show that 
nationalists are happy to remain in the UK under the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement's provisions. In addition, the data shows that the largest portion 
of people in Northern Ireland identify themselves as neither unionist nor 
nationalist.31 However, under the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, if a 
majority in Northern Ireland support Irish unification, then both 
governments are obliged to legislate for unification.32 However, the 
nationalist community's support for Remain during the Brexit referendum 
raised immediately the issue of Irish unification with the argument being 
made that if there was unification, Northern Ireland could stay in the EU. 
Sinn Fein called for a border poll and although they wavered in their emphasis 
 
30 Eileen Connelly and John Doyle, 'Brexit and the Irish Border' in this Special Issue. 
31 Katy Hayward and Cathal McManus, 'Neither/Nor: the rejection of Unionist and 
Nationalist identities in post-Agreement Northern Ireland' (2019) Capital and 
Class. 
32 John Doyle and Eileen Connolly 'Brexit and the Northeen Ireland Question' in 
Federico Fabbrini (ed) The Law and Politics of Brexit (Oxford University Press 2017) 
153. 
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on a poll,33 clearly Brexit affected the likelihood of unification to some 
degree. The fact that a majority of the electorate in Northern Ireland and an 
overwhelming majority of nationalists34 voted to remain in the EU also 
implied that the Irish government had a role in voicing concerns from 
nationalists in Northern Ireland. 
There is a broad consensus that the time is not ripe for a poll on unification. 
It is unclear whether there would be a majority in favour, as opinion poll data 
shows a on average a 50 per cent support base for it in Northern Ireland,35 but 
with a large number of 'Don't Knows' who could vote either way. Indeed a 
poll in May 2018 showed that only 42 per cent of Catholics supported a united 
Ireland.36 In addition, although opinion polls show that 64 per cent of the 
electorate in Ireland would support unification,37 when the caveat is added 
that this could mean higher taxes, support falls. A recent report stated that 
living standard in Ireland would fall by 15 per cent in the event of unification, 
if Northern Ireland lost its eleven billion euro subvention from the UK.38 
There would be significant institutional change in the event of unification, 
most likely creating a federal state, with parliaments in Belfast and Dublin. 
 
33 'Irish Times View On Sinn Fein's U-Turn on Border poll', Irish Times (2 August 
2018)<https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/editorial/irish-times-view-on-sinn-
féin-s-u-turn-on-a-border-poll-1.3583431> accessed 14 September 2019. 
34 Connolly and Doyle (n 30). 
35 Bill White, 'Poll Suggests Gradual Shift to united Ireland', Irish Times (1 October 
2018) <https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/polls-suggest-gradual-shift-to-united-
ireland-1.3645214> accessed 14 September 2019.  
36 Sam McBride, 'New poll finds just 21% support for a united Ireland, despite fears 
about post-Brexit Irish border', iNews (21 May 2018) <https://inews. 
co.uk/news/politics/new-poll-finds-just-21-support-for-a-united-ireland-despite-
fears-about-post-brexit-irish-border/> accessed 14 September 2019.  
37 'Irish Times View on All-Ireland Poll', Irish Times (7 March 2019) 
<https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/editorial/irish-times-view-on-all-ireland-
poll-politics-and-people-diverge-on-brexit-1.3818230?mode=sample&auth-
failed=1&pw-> accessed 14 September 2019.  
38 Eoin Burke-Kennedy, 'United Ireland would see living standards in Republic fall 




republic-fall-by-15-1.3629748> accessed 14 September 2019. 
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However, this would undoubtedly involve onerous change administratively 
and institutionally and probably create pressure for greater decentralisation 
of the highly centralised Irish state. It is precisely these questions that are 
becoming the focus of academic attention.39 However, all the main parties in 
Ireland are aware that a poll on unification would further destabilise and 
polarise Northern Ireland and do not want to aggravate the new tensions 
created by Brexit.   
2.  The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 
Although an unintended and indirect consequence of Brexit, following the 
June 2017 UK election, the DUP's Confidence and Supply arrangement with 
the Conservative-led UK government immediately brought into question the 
UK's role, enshrined by the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, as an honest 
neutral broker in the politics of Northern Ireland. The DUP's pivotal 
position in the UK government contributed to provocative language from 
the Taoiseach Leo Varadkar. For example, in December 2017 he stated that 
'no Irish government will ever again leave Northern nationalists and 
Northern Ireland behind.'40 
More specifically, as Connelly and Doyle note in this special issue,41 Brexit 
potentially undermines Strand 2 of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, by 
creating a hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, thereby 
damaging cross-border cooperation. It was also unclear whether EU funding 
to Northern Ireland would continue.42 Thus, from June 2016, the Irish 
 
39 For example, there are two  recently launched research projects: John Coakley, Paul 
Gillespie, Jennifer Todd, 'Constitutional Futures After Brexit', Institute for 
British-Irish Studies, University College Dublin, available at 
<https://www.ucd.ie/ibis/newsevents/> and Alan Renwick et al, 'Unification 
Referendums on the Island of Ireland', The Constitution Unit, University College 
London.  
40 Marie O'Halloran, 'Varadkar clarifies 'offensive' remark on Northern Ireland', 
Irish Times (12 December 2017) <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/ 
oireachtas/varadkar-clarifies-offensive-remark-on-northern-ireland-1.3325231> 
accessed 14 September 2019. 
41 Connelly and Doyle (n 30). 
42 Jonathon Tonge, 'The Impact of Withdrawal from the European Union upon 
Northern Ireland' (2016) 87(3) Political Quarterly 338 – 342. 
 
2019} UK-Irish Relations 287 
 
government lobbied vigorously for four priorities to be included in the EU's 
Brexit bargaining agenda: first, to maintain the 1948 Common Travel Area 
(CTA) between Ireland and the UK; second, to protect the Belfast/Good 
Friday Agreement; and third, to protect a soft border between Northern 
Ireland and Ireland – freedom of movement of trade and services and to 
protect the rights of Irish citizens in the UK.43 
Fourthly, the Irish government lobbied to ensure that these issues would be 
resolved in the withdrawal negotiations and not form part of the negotiations 
on the future trading relationship between the UK and the EU. In other 
words, the negotiations about Northern Ireland and about the EU-UK 
future trading relationship respectively would occur sequentially, not 
simultaneously. The Irish government suspected that, if simultaneous 
negotiations occurred, the UK government would use the Northern Irish 
issue as a bargaining chip to gain trade concessions from the EU. In such a 
bargaining game, it was feared that a soft border could be sacrificed in the 
final outcome.  
3. Trust issues and conflicts of interest 
Thus, Brexit immediately lessened trust between both governments by 
placing them on opposite sides of the table in the negotiations. It also 
revealed a divergence between both governments in their emphasis on 
Northern Ireland. Connelly and Doyle show how this divergence was obvious 
from the period of the Brexit referendum campaign onwards.44 One adviser 
to David Cameron reported how the then UK leader refused to include the 
negative impact of a Brexit vote on Northern Ireland in the Brexit 
campaign.45 After the referendum, although many UK politicians were aware 
of the serious implications for Northern Ireland, not least the House of 
 
43 Etain Tannam, 'Intergovernmental and Cross-Border Cooperation: the Good 
Friday Agreement and Brexit' (2018) 17(3) Ethnopolitics 255. 
44 Connelly & Doyle (n 30). 
45 Matthew O'Toole, 'Ireland an afterthought during Brexit campaign when I was 
Cameron adviser', Irish Times (4 October 2017) <https://www. 
irishtimes.com/opinion/ireland-an-afterthought-during-brexit-campaign-when-i-
was-cameron-adviser-1.3242732> accessed 14 September 2019. 
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Lords Brexit committee,46 it was only under Irish governmental influence 
that the UK government began to focus at all on Northern Ireland. Even then 
there were various reports that some Conservative politicians believed the 
EU would not prioritise Northern Ireland, once the UK agreed its 'divorce 
bill' with the EU. Similarly, there were reports that UK politicians believed 
that the EU's support for the Irish government's position would waver and, 
as a consequence, UK officials lobbied in EU capitals in an effort to 'divide 
and conquer' EU states.47 These very different and conflictual perceptions 
created a new cleavage between UK and Irish governments and periodically 
contributed to blunt megaphone diplomacy not heard since the 1980s, for 
example during the H-Block hunger strikes in 1981.   
The incompatibility between the UK leaving the EU, including its customs 
union and single market, and maintaining an open border in the island of 
Ireland made a bespoke solution, or special status for Northern Ireland the 
only possible solution in the negotiations. The so-called 'backstop' in the 
Withdrawal Agreement, negotiated by Theresa May's government and the 
EU, was immediately opposed by unionists48 and by Brexiteers who argued it 
undermined Northern Ireland's constitutional status in the UK. Thus, by 
March 2019, sources of tension in the British-Irish relationship coalesced 
around the backstop's inclusion in the Withdrawal Agreement,  despite the 
fact that Theresa May and her team had agreed  the backstop with the EU in 
the negotiations.  
Worryingly, although all attention was focused on the backstop and the 
border issue, Brexit also posed other deep long-term challenges to the 
British-Irish relationship. Almost immediately after the 2016 referendum, 
there were implications for trust and sharing of information between both 
governments.  The Irish government feared that Northern Ireland would be 
used as a pawn by the UK government to achieve a more favourable final trade 
 
46 House of Lords, "Brexit Inquiry", Brexit and British-Irish Relations, House of 
Lords, London, 12 December 2016. 
47 Daniel Boffey, 'UKs pre-summit push to 'divide and rule EU27' impeded Brexit 
talks', The Guardian (29 October 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics 
/2017/oct/29/uks-pre-summit-push-to-divide-and-rule-eu-27-impeded-brexit-
talks> accessed 14 September 2019. 
48 Doyle and Connolly (n 32). 
 
2019} UK-Irish Relations 289 
 
deal for the UK. For that reason it successfully lobbied the other EU Member 
States and the Commission to ensure that trade talks and the withdrawal 
agreement were not negotiated simultaneously, as the UK government 
preferred, but sequentially. The border issue must be resolved first before 
trade talks could begin. This preference was immediately at odds with UK 
preferences, again creating tension between both governments.  
4. Removal of EU framework for cooperation  
A fourth challenge is that the opportunities for communication offered by 
the EU will vanish with Brexit. The frequency with which British and Irish 
officials and politicians met with each other in Brussels will be difficult to 
replicate when the UK leaves the EU. Moreover, when the UK leaves, Ireland 
will lose an ally in the EU. Both governments often converged in their 
attitudes on a number of EU issues, including taxation and social policy. 
Ireland relied on the UK to serve its cause. The absence of that informal 
alliance removes a pillar of cooperation from the bilateral relationship.  
The challenges posed by Brexit were aggravated by the collapse of the 
Northern Ireland Executive in January 2017, by a weak and divided UK 
government in disarray, relying on the DUP after the June 2017 election, and 
by Jeremy Corbyn's lacklustre support for the EU. The challenges took their 
toll on the British-Irish relationship. Since June 2016 there have been three 
main periods in the British-Irish relationship, where tensions have ebbed and 
flowed. As the next paragraphs show these tensions have heightened at 
specific times. 
IV. BREXIT AND THE BRITISH-IRISH RELATIONSHIP, 2016-2019 
In the immediate aftermath of the Brexit referendum result the Irish 
government was clearly deeply disappointed, but the rhetorical response was 
low-key. Enda Kenny, then Taoiseach, issued a statement pledging to adopt  
'the same spirit of partnership that has underpinned the peace process and 
has transformed relationships on this island since the Good Friday 
Agreement'49 and emphasised how he and David Cameron 'worked closely 
 
49 Enda Kenny, 'Statement by An Taoiseach, Enda Kenny TD, on the UK Vote to 
Leave the European Union' (Merrionstreet.ie, 24 June 2016) 
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together at a time of unprecedented warmth in relations between our two 
countries.' 50 
However, the issue of Irish unification raised its head quickly. In July 2016, 
Enda Kenny stated that a border poll on Irish unity should be considered 
because a majority of the Northern Ireland electorate voted to remain in the 
EU.51 Both  Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin called for a border poll. Sinn Féin later 
said that unification was a long term strategy, implying it did not want a poll 
quickly. Fianna Fáil and the Irish government also ceased mentioning it, 
although Fianna Fail initiated a study of different options for Irish 
unification.  
Overall, the aftermath of the Brexit referendum was marked by a noticeable 
lack of engagement from the UK government, contributing to an increasingly 
strained relationship.52 In addition, the UK government sought to divide and 
conquer EU states so as to undermine the Irish government's lobbying efforts 
to prioritise the border issue and agree on that priority first before moving to 
trade negotiations. In April 2017, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Charlie Flanagan, expressed frustration at the UK government's failure to 
communicate directly with the Irish government.53  A significant change in 
the conduct of relations was highlighted by the UK government's 
announcement via the UK Embassy in Dublin that it was withdrawing from 
the 1964 Fisheries Convention that allowed fishing in coastal waters from the 




n.html> accessed 14 September 2019. 
50 Enda Kenny (n 48). 
51 Pat Leahy, 'Kenny Says Border Poll Should Be Considered in Brexit Talks', Irish 
Times (16 July 2016) <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/kenny-says-
border-poll-should-be-considered-in-brexit-talks-1.2726382> accessed 14 
September 2019. 
52 Mary C Murphy, Europe and Northern Ireland's Future: negotiating Brexit's Unique Case 
(Agenda 2018) 115. 
53 Pat Leahy, 'Minister criticises British government over Brexit strategy' Irish Times 
(24 December 2016) <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/minister-
criticises-british-government-over-brexit-strategy-1.2916819> accessed 14 
September 2019. 
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decision from media channels, despite having met with the UK Minister for 
Agriculture about the Convention in early July.54  
Similarly, in July 2017, the Taoiseach Leo Varadkar spoke bluntly in a media 
briefing stating that '[w]hat we're not going to do is to design a border for the 
Brexiteers because they're the ones who want a border. If anyone should be 
angry it's us, quite frankly.'55 Whereas in the 1990s, both governments 
consulted with each other before making statements of relevance to the 
relationship, in September 2017, the then Minister  for Foreign Affairs Simon 
Coveney stated his government's opposition to any technical solutions to the 
Irish border, thereby for the first time explicitly opposing the UK 
government's policy statement about the border. 
The UK government's official response was muted and in that way tensions 
did not escalate. However, it was the absence of direct communication from 
the UK and the infrequency of prime ministerial meetings that often 
aggravated tensions. Theresa May and the then Taoiseach Enda Kenny had 
two meetings from June 2016 to January 2017,56 which given the potential 
impact of Brexit on Ireland and Northern Ireland was lower than might be 
expected. The UK government frequently stated that they were wedded to a 
frictionless border and that there would be no return to the borders of the 
past. However, there was no engagement about how to achieve that aim in 
the context maintaining the integrity of the EU single market. In addition, 
some UK media depictions of Ireland and of the Taoiseach became negative 
at times and some Irish media analyses of the UK also reverted to stereotypes 
of 'lost empire'.  
 
54 'British ban on foreign trawlers 'unhelpful', says Creed', Irish Times (2 July 2017) 
<https://www.irishtimes.com/news/environment/british-ban-on-foreign-trawlers-
unhelpful-says-creed-1.3140783> accessed 1 October 2019. 
55 'Ireland "will not design a border for the Brexiteers", says Taoiseach', The Guardian 
(28 July 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/28/taoiseach-leo-
varadkar-ireland-not-design-border-brexiteers> accessed 14 September 2019. 
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The Irish government's concerted lobbying effort succeeded, as Connelly 
and Doyle note.57 The EU made it clear that the Brexit negotiations would 
not move on to future trade relations unless the Irish government was 
satisfied about the Northern Ireland border issue.58  Indeed, as Fabbrini has 
noted, the EU has been remarkably united in its approach to Brexit.59 The 
EU stated that all  issues would have to be addressed to the satisfaction of the 
EU before phase two of the negotiations would be dealt with. The EU's 
strong commitment to the border issue contributed to increased British 
engagement with the issue. However, despite the many sources of tension 
and the above examples of negative political rhetoric, there was a noticeable 
decline in megaphone diplomacy from December 2016 to December 2018,  as 
the next section shows.  
First of all, the EU's commitment to Northern Ireland influenced the UK 
government's Position Paper on Northern Ireland in August 2017.60  
Although the paper was short on detail, it dealt with each EU priority 
systematically and pledged to have no physical infrastructure on the border. 
The Irish government welcomed it cautiously, stating there were still 
unanswered questions and from this period onwards, while lobbying 
intensively, the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs particularly was at pains to 
show an understanding of Theresa May's domestic constraints.61 However, 
there were no prime ministerial meetings and continued weakness in 
 
57 See Connelly & Doyle (n 30). 
58 'Ireland will have final say on progress of Brexit talks, says EU', The Guardian (1 
December 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/dec/01/ireland-will-
have-final-say-on-progress-of-brexit-talks-says-eu> accessed 14 September 2019. 
59 Federico Fabbrini, 'The Future of the EU 27' in Federico Fabbrini (ed) The Law and 
Politics of  Brexit, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press 2019). 
60 'Position Paper on Northern Ireland', (Gov.uk, 16 August 2017) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/northern-ireland-and-ireland-a-
position-paper> accessed 14 September 2019. 
61 'Coveney says Brexit deal can be sold persuasively over two-and-a-half weeks', Irish 
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developing joined-up high level engagement on the UK side. Moreover the 
UK government's Florence Speech in September 2017 was regarded in 
Dublin as a disappointment, as it devoted very little attention to the 
Northern Ireland issue.62  
In contrast, in December 2017 a joint report between the EU and UK 
negotiators was published,63 following a delay caused by DUP opposition.64 
It included a commitment to a backstop solution to the Irish border if the 
UK left the customs union and the single market. The solution was that if the 
UK did leave the customs union and the single market, Northern Ireland 
would remain aligned to the EU single market rulebook and hence trade 
freely with Ireland and the rest of the EU. Regulatory alignment would occur 
to ensure Northern Irish goods were subject to EU quality standards. The 
December 2017 joint report was welcomed by the Irish government and its 
key provisions were included in the final draft Withdrawal Agreement 
published in November 2018.65  
The interim period from December 2017 to November 2018 was 
characteristically volatile, but in general saw a marked decline in negative 
rhetoric from the Irish governments. This was despite the particularly 
stressful European Council summit in Salzburg in September 2018, when 
Theresa May gave a stark uncompromising speech in response to the EU 
rejecting the UK government's White Paper – the  Chequers Plan.66 In 
 
62 Etain Tannam, 'Theresa May's Florence speech and Northern Ireland: subtle 
change?' LSE Brexit Blog (29 September 2017) <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ 
brexit/2017/09/29/is-the-negative-tide-of-british-irish-relations-receding/> 
accessed 14 September 2019. 
63 European Commission, Joint Report (8 December 2017), available at 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf>. 
64 Tony Connelly, Brexit and Ireland: the dangers, the opportunities and the inside story of 
the Irish response (Penguin 2017). 
65 'Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community, as agreed at negotiators' level' (14 November 2018), available at 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_withdrawal_ 
agreement_0.pdf>. 
66 Policy Paper The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, 
(Gov.uk, 17 July 2018) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-future-
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addition, the Irish Tánaiste Simon Coveney explicitly emphasised that 'the 
challenges of these Brexit negotiations should never be twisted into tools for 
a constitutional agenda for Northern Ireland,'67 thereby rejecting using 
unification as a political football.  
In November 2018, the Withdrawal Agreement between the UK and the EU 
was finally announced amid moving responses from both Leo Varadkar and 
Simon Coveney. The former stated that 'I want to acknowledge Prime 
Minister May's integrity in honouring her promise to protect the Peace 
Process and the Good Friday Agreement. And her commitment to avoid a 
hard border. She has been true to her word'.68 
Yet, the period of relief was short-lived, as immediately the Irish 
government's success in EU bargaining was met with wrath by Brexiteers.69 
In February 2019, continuing disarray in the UK parliament's ratification 
process led to Theresa May supporting the Brady Amendment.70 This called 
for the removal of the backstop form the Withdrawal Agreement, thus 
reneging on the Withdrawal deal she herself had agreed with the EU in 
November 2018. Her apparent reneging on the Withdrawal Agreement led 
to hard-line rhetoric once more from both Simon Coveney and Leo 
Varadkar.  
Theresa May requested that she meet with Leo Varadkar in Dublin on 8 
February 2019, following her meeting in Brussels the day before, and reports 
stated that the  meeting was cordial and useful.71  An extension of the UK exit 
 
relationship-between-the-united-kingdom-and-the-european-union> accessed 14 
September 2019. 
67 Simon Coveney, 'Tanaiste's Speech at the British-Irish Association Conference', 
(Oxford, 8 September 2018) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
68 'Statement by Taoiseach Leo Varadkar on Withdrawal Agreement', 
(MerrionStreet.ie, 14 November 2018)  <https://merrionstreet.ie/en/News-
Room/News/Statement_by_Taoiseach_Leo_Varadkar_on_Withdrawal_Agreem
ent.html> accessed 14 September 2019. 
69 See Federico Fabbrini in this Special Issue. 
70 House of Commons Order Paper No.240: Part 1, 21, 29 January 2019. 
71 Kevin Doyle, 'No breakthrough' on Brexit deal as Varadkar and May meet in 
Dublin', Irish Independent (8 February 2019) <https://www.independent.ie/irish-
news/no-breakthrough-on-brexit-deal-as-varadkar-and-may-meet-in-dublin-
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date to October 31 2019 was granted by the EU. The hope was that revision 
of the EU's interpretive statement or political declaration on the future 
trading relationship would occur and revision of the political declaration was 
mentioned  by one Irish politician in the ruling party Fine Gael.72  
However, Theresa May announced her resignation on May 24 2019,73 with 
Boris Johnson taking over as Prime Minister in July 2019. As such, divisions 
in the UK will continue, as shown by the success of the UK Brexit Party in 
the EP elections in May 2019.  
V. THE FUTURE OF THE BRITISH-IRISH RELATIONSHIP  
The above overview of trends in the British-Irish relationship since 2016 
leads to some observations about the relationship during the Brexit era and 
also some prescriptions for its future management. Brexit has clearly cast a 
deep cloud over the British-Irish relationship. Relations have not been as 
tense since the early 1980s and political rhetoric that had vanished by the 
1990s re-emerged. The joined-up thinking and mutual problem-solving that 
typified the peace process and began in the mid-1980s were not evident. 
There were no joint statements by both governments  and very few joint press 
conferences after meetings. Indeed, there were very few meetings between 
both Prime Ministers given the magnitude of the Brexit crisis. The core 
questions are whether the relationship has been irreparably damaged and 
how best to manage the relationship after the UK has left the EU. 
The escalation in tensions at various times since summer 2016 has been a 
source of surprise for seasoned observers of the relationship. The speed with 
which apparently deep cooperation regressed was startling. While the above 
section has highlighted that both governments attempted to manage the 
relationship diplomatically and hard-line language was only used for strategic 
 
72 Neale Richmond, RTE Prime Time (12 March 2019), available at 
<https://www.rte.ie/player/series/prime-time/SI0000000825?epguid=IH000368 
177> accessed 14 September 2019. 
73 Denis Staunton, 'May Defiantly Defended Record Before Her Voice Began To 
Crack', Irish Times (25 May 2019) <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/uk/ 
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reasons, there has been a clear departure from the cooperative 
intergovernmentalism that began in the mid-1980s.  
Specifically, the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference did not meet 
regularly in the ten years before the Brexit referendum. This weakness is 
partially explained by a reduction in the number of non-devolved policy areas 
in Northern Ireland following the 2006 St Andrews Agreement.74 However, 
it also reflected a deeper weakness in implementing the Good Friday 
Agreement that stemmed from both governments placing less priority on 
Northern Ireland. Although the peace process 'brought a new British-Irish 
rhetoric of "best friends" […] the informal British-Irish mode of 
implementing the Agreement […] was dependent on the states' prioritisation 
of Northern Ireland. After 2010 this weakened.'75 Given its sensitivity for 
unionists, the failure to meet regularly in a routine way made it far harder to 
resurrect it post-2016. Yet it was the obvious institution for both 
governments to discuss Brexit's challenges.  
The British-Irish Council did meet regularly. Indeed by 2017 it had met 29 
times and had produced 'a formidable volume of useful reports'76 on policy 
areas of common interest. However,  its 'precise value is unclear.'77 It is purely 
consultative and no UK Prime Minister has attended its meetings since Tony 
Blair.78 Indicative of the greater attention paid to Northern Ireland by Irish 
governments, all Irish Taoisigh have attended the British-Irish Council 
meetings since its creation.  
The Brexit era has shown that British-Irish cooperation was not as embedded 
as previously assumed. In fact, it highlighted that although the Belfast/Good 
 
74 John Coakley, 'British-Irish Institutional Structures: towards a new relationship' 
(2014) 29(1) Irish Political Studies 81. 
75 Jennifer Todd, 'The Vulnerability of the Northern Ireland Settlement: British-
Irish Relations, Political Crisis and Brexit' (2015) 40(2) Etudes irlandaises 4. 
76 John Coakley 'The British-Irish Relationship in the 21st Century' in Tannam (ed) 
Beyond the Good Friday Agreement: in the midst of Brexit (London Routledge 2018) 97. 
77 Mary C Murphy, Europe and Northern Ireland's Future: negotiating Brexit's Unique Case 
(Agenda 2018) 107. 
78 Etain Tannam, 'Intergovernmental and Cross-Border Cooperation: the Good 
Friday Agreement and Brexit', in Tannam (ed) Beyond the Good Friday Agreement: in 
the midst of Brexit (London Routledge 2018) 27. 
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Friday Agreement and its accompanying British-Irish Agreement are 
international treaties, there was no obligation that the British-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference would meet regularly. There was a set 
schedule for  meetings of the North South Ministerial Council, subject to 
Strand 1 institutions being in place, and there was also a set schedule for the 
British-Irish Council. However, there was no legally binding schedule for 
British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference meetings. The frequency of 
meetings is therefore a function of political will and given potentially 'grave 
clashes of interest' between the British and Irish sides, there is potential for 
deterioration in the relationship as the Brexit negotiations proceed.79 These 
clashes of interest are also likely after the Brexit era, given the UK's absence 
from the EU.  
Although not directly related to Brexit, a stark warning of the need for legally 
binding agreements occurred in June 2019 when the Scottish government 
called for the Irish government to call on Irish fishermen fishing off Rockall 
island to cease fishing immediately within the 12 mile exclusion zone, or face 
enforcement action.80 Rockall is between Donegal and  Scotland and is by 
agreement part of UK sovereign territory. However the Irish government 
claims that Rockall is part of EU fisheries policy giving equal access to both 
states. In practice the issue was ignored for decades and according to Donegal 
politicians, Irish fishermen had not increased their fishing activities at 
Rockall, but the Scottish action highlighted how issues can escalate when 
contextual conditions alter.81 The SNP-led Scottish government is pro-
remain, but the Scottish fishing community supports Brexit. Arguably the 
Scottish government behaved in an adversarial manner about Rockall to gain 
the fishing community's support despite the SNP's remain stance.  
In addition, post-Brexit, there will be an obvious temptation for UK 
governments to lobby Irish governments to influence the EU in the UK's 
 
79 Coakley (n 76) 99. 
80 'Fisheries Dispute Breaks out Between Ireland and Scotland', RTE News (8 June 
2019) <https://www.rte.ie/news/2019/0607/1054110-fishing-dispute-rockall/> 
accessed 14 September 2019. 
81 There was no reference made by the Scottish government to any connection 
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issue.  
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favour on specific policy issues, but Irish governments will resist such efforts, 
potentially causing more tension.  
The risks to future relations necessitate a more formalised relationship. A 
key condition for future British-Irish cooperation is that regular prime 
ministerial meetings occur and that the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement's 
institutions are used robustly. Since 2006, Strand 1 received far more 
attention politically than the other strands of the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement. For many, Strands 2 and 3 were a package deal to placate 
nationalists who wanted strong cross-border institutions (Strand 2) and 
Unionists who wanted East-West institutions (Strand 3). However, as this 
article has shown, the concept of the totality of the relationship and John 
Hume's strategy emphasised all three strands working in tandem. Indeed, the 
peace process and the success of Strand 1 rested on close British-Irish 
cooperation.  
As table 1 shows, Theresa May and Leo Vardakar met nearly every month 
from February 2018 to February 2019. However, it is equally evident that if 
the EU had not prioritised the Northern Irish issue, it would have been far 
more difficult to engage the UK  Prime Minister's attention.   
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82 Source: Department of Taoiseach, Dublin.  
February 2018 
12th Meeting with PM May, Stormont House, Belfast 
March 2018 
22nd – 23rd March European Council - Taoiseach meets with PM 
May in margins. 
May 2018 
17th  Taoiseach met with PM May in the margins of the EU-
Western Balkans Summit in Sofia. 
June 2018 
28th  Taoiseach met with PM May at European Council 
September 2018 
20th  Taoiseach and MoS EU McEntee meet with PM May  
(Informal European Council, Salzburg) 
October 2018 
17th  Taoiseach meets bilaterally with PM May in margins of 
European Council 
November 2018 
25th Taoiseach spoke briefly with PM May on the margins at 
Special European Council meeting (Art 50) 
December 2018 
13th  Taoiseach met with PM May at European Council 
February 2019 
8th Taoiseach met with PM May in Farmleigh House 
25th Taoiseach met with PM May at Arab-EU Summit 
 




The voluntary basis to the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference is at 
odds with the EU model of cooperation so espoused by John Hume and oft-
cited after the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement was signed. Specifically, the 
European Council – representing EU Heads of State and Government and 
analogous to the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference – is obliged to 
meet at least every six months under Article 15(3) of the Treaty on European 
Union, and in fact practically meets almost every other month. According to 
institutionalist logic and John Hume's strategy, the decline in 
communication after June 2016 and the resurrection of tension in the British-
Irish relationship require institutionalised formalised meetings. Therefore, 
as a minimum requirement for helping to ensure future British-Irish 
cooperation, the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference should be 
legally obliged to meet at regular intervals.  
More robust use of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement's bilateral 
institutions, while a necessary condition for future cooperation, is not 
necessarily sufficient. The EU's dense institutional framework and extensive 
policy competence implies that a multi-layered institutional framework is 
needed for British-Irish cooperation to continue and deepen. Therefore, as 
well as greater use of the Agreement's bilateral institutions, and agreements 
related to areas of common British-Irish concern, for example the CTA, 
energy and infrastructure, provided they do not encroach on EU policy 
competence, would help emulate the EU's policy framework.  
Although a Strand 2 cross-border institution, the North South Ministerial 
Council provides a template for organising sectoral cross-border meetings. 
Six cross-border bodies were created, following unionist pressure to 
minimise the number of bodies created: the Trade and Business 
Development Body (Intertrade Ireland), Waterways Ireland, the Food 
Safety Body (Safefood), Foyle, Carlingford and the Irish Lights Commission, 
The Language Body, and the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB).83 In 
addition, six areas of cooperation, without joint bodies, were identified: 1) 
Agriculture: Common Agricultural Policy issues, Animal and Plant Health 
 
83 NSMC, 'North South Implementation Bodies' (2016) <https://www.north 
southministerialcouncil.org/content/north-south-implementation-bodies)>. 
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Policy and Research Rural Development; 2) Education: Education for 
children with special needs, educational under-achievement, teacher 
qualifications and school, youth and teacher exchanges; 3) Environment: 
Environment protection, pollution, water quality management and waste 
management in a cross-border content; 4) Health: Accident and emergency 
planning, co-operation on high technology equipment, cancer research and 
health promotion; 5) Tourism including Tourism Ireland: The promotion of 
the island of Ireland overseas as a  tourist destination via the establishment 
of a new company, known as Tourism Ireland; and 6) Transport: Co-
operation on a strategic road and rail infrastructure and public transport 84 
Before the creation of the NSMC, administrative cooperation between 
officials was patchy. Indeed there were conflicts of interest between many 
departments, north and south of the border. However, gradually after the 
establishment of the NSMC, cooperation flourished, despite the many 
problems caused by the collapsed Executive and by unionist suspicion of 
cross-border cooperation. Although policy dynamism did not develop for 
Northern Irish political reasons, contacts between civil servants were 
reported in some sectors to be strong, for example in agriculture. Table 2 
shows the web of cooperation across the civil service caused by preparation 
for NSMC sectoral meetings.  
 
84 NSMC, 'Areas of cooperation' (2016) <https://www.northsouthministerial 
council.org/areas-of-cooperation)>. 
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Table 2. Civil Service Cooperation Under NSMC85 
  
A series of bilateral sectoral agreements in areas of common concern, 
obliging officials and ministers to meet regularly, could emulate the NSMC 
idea, without necessitating a coordinating institution.  
It is likely that both governments will support increased legalisation of 
current arrangements. Indeed, Simon Coveney stated that the British-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference in July 2018 'will take forward proposals for 
future East-West cooperation […] this should be comprehensive across all 
policy areas of shared concern and should culminate in meetings at the 
highest political levels'.86 Similarly, Theresa May stated that  
we already have the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference and regular 
Summits between UK and Irish politicians. But as we leave the European 
 
85 Source: Etain Tannam, British-Irish Relations in the 21st Century (Oxford University 
Press, forthcoming). 
86 Coveney (n 67). 
 
2019} UK-Irish Relations 303 
 
Union, we will need to establish new ways of coming together to develop 
further our unique relationship.87  
Clearly, bilateral policy agreements could be established under the British-
Irish Intergovernmental Conference framework. Moreover in May 2019 
both governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding to codify the 
CTA.88 
Overall, cooperation necessitates a multi-pronged institutional approach to 
ensure that, at any given time, various civil servants and ministers from both 
jurisdictions are in both formal and informal contact. Thus, fuller use of the 
British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference and the British-Irish Council, 
as well as policy-based bilateral agreements stemming from the British-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference would attempt to partially fill the gap left by 
the UK's departure from the EU.    
VI. CONCLUSION 
The future path of the British-Irish relationship is paved with many risks and 
the optimism of the pre-Brexit era has waned. The period from 2016 to 2019 
showed how quickly the habit of cooperation can be reversed, but it also 
showed how aware senior officials and diplomats are of the need to manage 
the relationship. In particular the Irish government during this period 
stepped back from using Irish unification as a political football and Irish 
diplomats lobbied intensively to ensure that greater attention was paid by the 
UK government to both Northern Ireland and to the Irish government. Over 
time, the UK government responded, albeit under pressure from the EU also.  
Despite the tensions, both governments are aware that the relationship 
cannot be taken for granted and, as this article has noted, recently both the 
UK Prime Minister and the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs have referred 
 
87 Theresa May, 'PM Speech in Belfast' (Gov.uk, 5 February 2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-in-belfast-5-february-
2019> accessed 14 September 2019. 
88 Denis Staunton, 'British and Irish Governments Sign Common Travel Area 
agreement', Irish Times (8 May 2019) <https://www.irishtimes.com/ 
news/politics/britain-and-ireland-to-sign-common-travel-area-deal-1.3884176> 
accessed 8 October 2019. 
 
304 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
 
 
to the need to make better use of the British-Irish Intergovernmental 
Conference. It is likely that in securing more robust use of the Strand 3 
institutions, the Irish government will lead the efforts, partly because the UK 
government will have a daunting policy agenda. However, the Irish 
government has proved adept at lobbying and therefore while the halcyon 
days of the 1990s will not return, the relationship is likely to be relatively 
cooperative in the decades ahead, 'in the shadow and shelter'89 of each other. 
 
 
89 Simon Coveney citing President Michael D Higgins (n 67). 
